7-3-20 How Companies Fleeced American Workers Out of Wages and Benefits
How the American Worker Got Fleeced
Over the years, bosses have held down wages, cut
benefits, and stomped on employees’ rights. Covid-19 may change that.
Story by Josh Eidelson
Data analysis and graphics by Christopher Cannon
Data analysis and graphics by Christopher Cannon
July 2, 2020 Business Week
Amazon.com Inc. fired
Emily Cunningham a little before the end of Good Friday, though the human
resources rep put it a little differently. “You have ended your relationship
with Amazon,” Cunningham recalls being told an hour after her company email
account stopped working. She’d been a software engineer at the Seattle
headquarters for seven years. The HR rep didn’t cite any deficiencies in her
work but said she’d violated company policies. According to Amazon, she’d been
breaking its rule against “solicitations.” Cunningham says that’s a policy
ignored on a daily basis when it comes to things like selling Girl Scout
Cookies in the office.
Neither
Cunningham nor fellow software engineer Maren Costa, a 15-year Amazon employee
fired the same day, were big in the Thin Mints game. But both had been
challenging the company’s Covid-19 safety policies and mobilizing others to
join them. They’d urged their white-collar colleagues to rally behind Amazon
warehouse workers who’d gone on strike to demand stronger protective measures.
Cunningham had just sent an email to an internal listserv condemning the treatment of worker
Chris Smalls, fired the day he led a strike over safety in his New York City
warehouse. In the email, Cunningham noted that U.S. law and Amazon’s own
policies recognize employees’ right to communicate about conditions at their
workplaces, which very much included precautions against the coronavirus
pandemic sweeping through the country.
“We
support every employee’s right to criticize their employer’s working
conditions, but that does not come with blanket immunity against any and all
internal policies,” Amazon said in a statement. Cunningham says identifying
bugs and fixes for them is just part of working at a tech company. “If you
don’t listen to the workers,” she says, “you’re going to miss some very simple
things.”
These
terminations fit a pattern that goes beyond Amazon. A few months before
Cunningham got the HR call, Google fired four software
engineers who’d been organizing to change things like its work for the Pentagon
and its handling of harassment on YouTube. (Google has said it fired them for
violating data security rules.) In the corona era, medical staff who’ve spoken
out about problems have been axed, too. A Washington state emergency room
doctor who posted about his safety concerns on Facebook was terminated swiftly by his hospital’s
staffing agency, according to a lawsuit he’s since filed. (The staffing agency
said it offered to place him at a different hospital instead.)
For
Americans with a less fancy résumé than the typical physician or Google
engineer, the coronavirus has exacerbated an already dire lack of employment
security. A great many essential workers have been growing, picking, tending,
slaughtering, packing, preparing, and delivering food throughout the country
without paid sick days. While other countries moved quickly to backstop
payrolls and freeze their economies more or less in place, the U.S. let 40 million people
go unemployed and has kept many of them waiting months for temporary
assistance.
Long
before the pandemic, U.S. workers’ productivity and their median pay, which
once rose in tandem, went through an acrimonious divorce. Compensation,
especially in some of the country’s fastest-growing industries, has stagnated,
while the costs of housing, health care, and education decidedly have not. The
federal minimum wage, stuck at $7.25 since 2009, is worth 70% of what it was in
1968, and about a third of what it would be had it kept pace with productivity.
Covid
helps clarify just how much employers have chipped away at the labor rights and
bargaining power that came with the New Deal. Legislation and court rulings
have outlawed key organizing and protest tactics, legalized aggressive anti-
union efforts, and radically shrunk the range of occupations granted basic
labor rights. Companies looking for a short-term jolt to their profit margin
have more incentives than ever to hire workers indirectly, keeping payroll and
liability off their own books. The pandemic certainly could give employers even
more power to set the rules. Or it could give workers a chance to end a heist
on a nationwide scale.
In
theory, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 protects people against
retaliation for the kinds of organizing the fired Amazon workers were doing,
much as the 1964 Civil Rights Act protects them against discrimination on the
basis of race or sex. In practice, the threshold for firings in the U.S.
is so low that it tends
to be difficult to prove an employer has crossed such a line. Employers can and
do terminate employees for having the wrong political candidate’s bumper sticker on
their car or volunteering on the
weekends at a local AIDS Foundation. And unlike the Civil Rights Act, the NLRA
offers legal recourse only through the National Labor Relations Board, where
the worst thing employers generally have to fear is that they’ll someday have to dole
out back pay, reinstate fired workers, and promise to change their behavior,
without any punitive damages or personal liability.
Two
years ago the NLRB ruled against a group
of nonunion janitors who alleged they’d been
terminated in retaliation for protesting abuses, which included a boss telling one
of them that the way to get paid more was to have sex with him. The three Trump
appointees said the workers erred in asking for help from the radio station
whose offices they cleaned, because it wasn’t their direct employer. Last year
the founder of the Barstool Sports blog empire posted tweets
threatening to fire anyone who talked to union activists, after which the site
sold T-shirts celebrating the controversy. Barstool, which didn’t respond to
requests for comment, settled with the NLRB
by agreeing to delete tweets and post a temporary notice saying it wouldn’t
threaten employees.
The
threat of retaliation helps transmute all sorts of requests into offers workers
can’t refuse, whether it’s smiling through abusive tirades, working overtime
without extra pay, or showing up for a shift in the middle of a pandemic. As
lockdowns began this spring, Daniel Stone, a market analyst for Dollar General
Corp., sent emails to managers and executives urging them to implement better
safety measures and hazard pay for the essential workers in the company’s
16,000 U.S. stores. “I think Dollar General had an opportunity, and I asked
them to take it in March, to be a leader,” says Stone, who worked at the
company’s headquarters near Nashville.
Beyond
some boilerplate responses, the higher-ups ignored him, he says, so he
solicited input from retail workers on Reddit, and created a private Facebook
group where workers could talk about organizing and swap horror stories about
the masks they were being given, made from T-shirt scraps. He also reached out
to the United Food & Commercial Workers International Union for support.
For
reasons that soon became obvious to Stone, the UFCW has had little success
unionizing Dollar General workers over the years. (Instead of negotiating
a contract with workers who voted to organize at one store, the company
contested the vote in court for years, then shut down the store.) In mid-April,
Stone was warned by a co-worker that his pseudonymous Reddit profile linked to
a SoundCloud account with his real name and that other people in the corporate
office were reading the subreddit where he was collecting complaints. But Stone
continued, and by the end of the month, the company had fired him over the
phone, framing it more as an opportunity for mutual growth.
“It’s come to management’s attention that
there’s been some negative emails and posts and other things like that about
the company, and there’s been a little bit of, kind of, it sounds like bad
blood,” senior director of market planning Jason Reese told Stone during the
call, which Stone recorded and shared with Bloomberg Businessweek. Stone stayed
polite and signed off with “hopefully the workers will get taken care of” and
“see you around.” To get his three months’ severance of about $15,000, Dollar
General said, he’d have to sign a nondisclosure agreement. He refused.
Dollar
General said in a statement that it has “a zero tolerance policy for unlawful
retaliation” and that it’s mounted a “thoughtful and comprehensive” Covid plan.
The company said Stone “did not, and does not, possess the information or
broader context to understand the many decisions that formed the foundation of
the Company’s response to this health crisis, and it is unfortunate that he
chose to conduct himself in a manner that was not in keeping with values and
expectations.”
One
thing that frequently unites U.S. employers of all kinds is fierce opposition
toward collective organizing. Two years ago, after managers at software startup
Lanetix discouraged employees from discussing workplace problems and implied
their jobs could be shipped to Eastern Europe, the programmers started
circulating union cards, according to employees. A week after they handed in
the cards, the company laid off every U.S.
programmer outside of the management team. Lanetix, which has since settled an NLRB
complaint and renamed itself Winmore, didn’t respond to requests for comment.
Unions
scare employers in part because unions can strike, and strikes work. (Just ask the
40-hour workweek.) But employers have spent decades striking back. Ronald
Reagan embodied and emboldened a wave of U.S. union-busting when, in 1981,
he axed striking air
traffic controllers. Capital mobility also made it easier for companies to take
advantage of old court rulings and legislation that
enabled the “permanent replacement” of striking workers, stripped unions of key
protest tactics, defunded them through “right-to-work” laws that
banned mandatory fees, and facilitated aggressive anti-organizing campaigns.
Given
the NLRB’s wrist-slap approach to enforcement, firing employees who try to
organize a union is one of the most effective short-term investments a company
can make. Labor relations consultants who help companies talk workers out of
organizing or keep tabs on them during disputes are thriving. Such firms don’t have to disclose
their full client lists, but a Businessweek review of annual federal
disclosures reveals a who’s-who of America’s boldface names, from Pepsi to
PetSmart. Companies have numerous ways to not-so-subtly talk workers out of
organizing. They can exercise their legal right to hold mandatory meetings
about the dangers of forming a union or hire consultants who specialize in
union busting to sow discord within the staff. Or they can, of course, simply
fire everyone.
The
past decade’s disputes at Boeing Co., once a union stronghold, show how
effective these tactics can be. In 2010, after a series of successful strikes
in the company’s home base of Washington state, an executive cited the work
stoppages as cause for the company to build its new line of airplanes in South
Carolina. By 2014, Boeing’s threat to shift more production out of Washington
led the International Association of Machinists to cut a deal that froze its
pension plan instead. And the union has struggled to make inroads at the South
Carolina plant, facing ferocious opposition from management as well as from
then-Governor Nikki Haley, who later
joined Boeing’s board.
During
a union drive at the
South Carolina plant in 2017, workers say, Boeing took out anti-union ads on
local TV stations and billboards and held mandatory anti-union meetings warning
about the possible costs. Trump’s NLRB appointees overturned a
successful 2018 vote among a smaller group at the plant, and Boeing fired five
vocal union advocates. The union’s NLRB complaint about that
is still pending. Boeing denies retaliation and says the five workers violated
“well-publicized, longstanding, and objectively reasonable safety and conduct
policies.”
All
this has left the South Carolina staffers hesitant to speak up about workplace
problems, says IAM activist Chris Jones, who’s worked at the plant since 2011.
That’s been especially true during the pandemic, because Boeing recently
announced plans to cut companywide head count by 10%. The company said in a
statement that it makes layoff decisions carefully and fairly.
In
Washington, the union contract dictates that layoffs be conducted based on
seniority, and the union says it’s in daily contact with Boeing to hash out
Covid safety procedures. In South Carolina, “people are afraid to raise issues
or concerns because they feel like that could affect how they’re graded for the
layoff,” Jones says. “There’s really no rules other than your manager giving
you a score.”
From
the beginning, workplace laws in the U.S. have left out a lot of workers. The
NLRA’s organizing rights explicitly excluded farm and domestic workers, a
carve-out soaked through with
racism and sexism. Other laws include exceptions for workforces of fewer than
15 people, disabled workers, tipped workers, prisoners, movie theater
attendants, and teenagers. The NLRA doesn’t apply to supervisors, a category in
which employers have placed many nurses and university professors, or to
independent contractors, a category into which companies have tried to shove
drivers, cooks, teachers, mixed martial artists,
video game developers, house cleaners, cable installers, strippers, and
lacrosse officiators.
That
includes people like Kym Thornton, who went door to door for Homefix Custom
Remodeling, pointing out mold at people’s houses and cajoling them to agree to
meet a sales rep. Thornton says Homefix, which had first caught his eye with a
Washington, D.C., subway ad promising full-time pay for part-time work,
eventually turned out to be the opposite: While working there full time, he
sometimes didn’t get paid at all, supposedly because none of the homeowners
he’d hit up ended up making a purchase. Thornton and other ex-staffers
are suing the company for
paying below minimum wage and for discriminating against workers of color by
sending them to poorer neighborhoods.
Homefix,
which classified the workers as independent contractors without minimum wage
protections, has denied the allegations. The plaintiffs say the company exerted
some very employer-like control, including mandatory uniforms, regular
(unpaid) training sessions, a noncompete policy, and surprisingly inflexible
schedules. Thornton left the company in 2018, after his boss reprimanded him
for missing work to attend a meeting about whether he could qualify for charity
assistance for cataract surgery.
The
NLRA’s blind spots have stretched wider as some of the industries lacking basic worker
protections have become more central to the U.S. economy. The number of
in-home-care workers more than doubled from 2008 to 2018, to about 2.3 million,
and it’s projected to expand by
an additional 1.3 million by 2028, as baby boomers grow more sedentary.
“They do not see us as important,” says June
Barrett, who spent 18 years caring for children and the elderly in their homes
in Florida and New Jersey after fleeing homophobic harassment in Jamaica.
“They’re still in plantation mode—they still own our bodies.” Before becoming a
full-time organizer last year with the National Domestic Workers Alliance,
Barrett endured years of workplace harassment, including groping, shoving, and
racist taunts.
U.S.
courts have offered workers little relief. Supreme Court rulings over the past
couple decades have allowed companies to make warehouse workers wait in line for
security checks without pay, even if it takes an hour a day; compel employees
to sign away their rights
to join class-action lawsuits; and refuse to pay undocumented workers who were
illegally fired. The Sherman Antitrust Act, meant to protect against “unlawful
restraints and monopolies,” now gets used to swat down so-called contractors’
efforts to set pay floors. In 2018 a federal appeals court doomed a Seattle
rule meant to help Uber drivers
organize, signaling that it conflicted with the Sherman prohibition on price
fixing.
Companies
such as Uber Technologies Inc. and Lyft Inc. are the best-known beneficiaries
of this sort of thing. When California lawmakers decided last year that
workers can’t be considered contractors if their duties fall within a company’s
usual course of business, Uber said its drivers
should still be contractors because its business is technology, an app, not
transportation. Never mind that the app acts as an aggressive central
dispatcher, that a number of drivers work full-time hours, or that Uber has
tried to block the public release of its drivers’ names by declaring them trade secrets. But the
arm’s-length nature of such supposedly not-employer-employee relationships has
spread through just about every U.S. industry in one form or another. They
allow companies to add layers of distance
between themselves and the responsibilities of a formal employer even if, in
practice, the name-brand company remains the ultimate boss.
Subcontractors
have been doing everything from hauling goods in
Walmart and Amazon warehouses to fact-checking the New
Yorker. Even among America’s most valuable businesses, contract labor has
expanded from supply closets and kitchens to programming jobs at the heart of
the operation. At Google parent Alphabet Inc., which counts more than 110,000
employees, the contract workers have overtaken the direct
workforce.
The
umbrella term here is “fissuring,” as in cracks in the workforce. In the
interest of short-term rewards to shareholders, executives have incentives to
offload as much of their day-to-day operations as possible to outside vendors,
reducing liability and payrolls on their balance sheets and challenging
contract staffing companies to underbid one another. Paying these workers
indirectly also makes it easier to pay them much less than their direct
co-workers, according to David
Weil, the dean of Brandeis University’s Heller School for Social Policy &
Management. When workers are subcontracted out of a company’s average pay
statistics and benefits packages, there’s less pressure to improve their
compensation.
At
Google these workers include people managing teams and testing self-driving
cars. At Apple Inc. they work on the Maps app
and on translating material to different regions. At Microsoft Corp. they
develop graphic design and test bugs. When a few dozen Microsoft bug testers in
the state of Washington unionized in 2014,
they learned how difficult it was to bargain without Microsoft itself at the
table. Their direct employer, the temp agency Lionbridge Technologies Inc.,
laid off their entire team two years later, and in 2018 the tiny union agreed
to settle its NLRB
complaint in exchange for some financial relief. “Crumbs,” says Philippe
Boucher, the union’s founder. For Microsoft, he says, the union was just “a
pebble in their shoe.”
Microsoft
has denied the union’s claims that it was legally responsible for the alleged
retaliatory layoffs. “This was a matter between Lionbridge and its employees,”
the company said in a statement. Lionbridge didn’t respond to requests for
comment.
Contract labor has
also been a prominent face of the coronavirus era. Many Americans sheltering in
place have become much better acquainted with Instacart, the grocery delivery
app maker, which expanded the ranks of
its shoppers from 180,000 to 500,000 within two months. On June 26, Seattle’s
mayor signed a law requiring food delivery companies to pay drivers an extra
$2.50 per delivery. Instacart immediately sued, complaining that the
law forces them to provide services without due consideration to profits.
This
past Mother’s Day, Gloria Machuca couldn’t hug her six kids. She’d been sent
home from one of the two Houston McDonald’s restaurants where she puts in a
combined 60-plus hours a week because a co-worker had tested positive for
Covid-19. She says both franchises made her stay home for two weeks in case she
had it, too, but neither agreed to cover her pay—$9.25 an hour at one, $8.25 at
the other—while she was stuck at home. Managers from both said “McDonald’s
doesn’t pay sick days,” says Machuca, who’s worked for Golden Arches outposts
for 20 years.
Like
many McDonald’s workers who’ve filed complaints or
mounted protests around the country, Machuca says her restaurants fell short on
basic safety measures, such as providing personal protective equipment early
on or facilitating social distancing. She says that before and during the pandemic
her bosses amplified health risks by refusing to provide paid sick days,
forcing employees to either spread the virus or forfeit needed income. The
franchise owners only agreed to pay for her quarantine in late May, after she
joined a streaming protest on Facebook with New York Senator Kirsten
Gillibrand. “What I’ve learned about McDonald’s and the manager and the store
owners is that they don’t care about us,” she says. “They treat you as if you
don’t matter.”
“We’re
confident the vast majority of restaurant employees impacted by Covid-19 are
getting paid sick leave,” McDonald’s said in a statement, citing a mix of
corporate and franchisee policies and federal, state, and local measures. The
company said it has “enhanced over 50 processes in restaurants” to boost safety
and distributed more than 100 million masks. It also provided statements from
Machuca’s franchise owners that say they offer masks, gloves, effective social
distancing policies, and paid sick days.
In
the U.S., companies can and often do legally refuse to provide paid sick days
to staff. When the pandemic placed this problem in stark relief, Congress
rushed to kind of fix it. The Families First Coronavirus Response Act, passed
in March, promises Covid-specific paid sick leave to U.S. employees, as long as they don’t
work for large companies, or small companies, or in health care, or as first
responders. In other words, it doesn’t apply to a lot of the essential workers
who need it most.
Even
where there are laws meant to protect some aspect of a worker’s life and
livelihood, enforcement is all too often weak. Employees lose an estimated $15
billion a year because companies simply don’t pay them the minimum wage they’re
owed—“wage theft” that rivals the total value of property crime the FBI tracks.
In most cases when
enforcers determine a worker’s wages have been stolen, the victim doesn’t get
compensated, the UCLA Labor Center and the National Employment Law Project
found in a 2013 study of California data. Bosses can evade liability through
tactics such as reconstituting their company under a different name.
The
federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration started the year with
only 862 inspectors, fewer than it’s had in decades. (One inspection of each
workplace that falls under its purview would take 165 years.) On
April 13, OSHA announced it would generally try to deal with employees’
coronavirus-related complaints informally, by asking employers to investigate
themselves. OSHA and its state-level equivalents have received more than 20,000
Covid-centric complaints this year,
including a number about medical facilities that banned protective masks.
OSHA
has closed thousands of Covid-related complaints and announced a citation against
only one company, for being slow to report a series of staff hospitalizations.
In the absence of serious penalties, meat-processing workers at Cargill
Inc. say supervisors told
them not to discuss infections; a Safeway Inc. warehouse discouraged employees
from using masks or gloves, according to a lawsuit filed by the family of
an employee who died in April; and state attorneys general say Walmart Inc.
managers allegedly pressured workers with Covid-19 symptoms to put on their
vests.
Cargill
says it considers health information private. Safeway has said employee health
is its top priority. Walmart said in a statement that it’s following the
“evolving guidance” of public-health experts.
It
could all still get worse. As states rushed to reopen, many unemployment
agencies were urging employers to
report staff who refuse invitations to come back to work. So more U.S. workers
will soon find themselves involuntarily tractor-beamed back into a working
environment that’s proved itself inhospitable even when there’s no pandemic.
America
doesn’t have to be like this. For all their faults, other rich countries
aren’t.
In
the U.S., the subject of labor-law reform tends to arise whenever Democrats see
a shot at retaking the White House and Congress, though the party rarely makes good on
its promises. In February, the Democratic-controlled U.S. House passed a bill, backed by
presumptive presidential nominee Joe Biden, aimed at ending right-to-work laws,
forced class-action waivers, mandatory anti-union meetings, and so-called
permanent replacement of strikers; legalizing a slew of strike tactics;
expanding the definition of “employee” to encompass far more fissured staff;
and giving the NLRB the power to strongly penalize companies and hold
executives personally liable for breaking the law.
In
January, Harvard Law School’s Labor & Worklife Program, following a year of
discussions among working groups of activists and scholars, released a
sweeping proposal to reboot
labor law from a “clean slate,” including by ending at-will employment,
installing elected “workplace monitors” in every U.S. workplace, and
establishing a “sectoral bargaining” process à la Europe. Advocates say such
a system, in which labor and
management hash out industrywide standards, would help fix one of the flaws
baked into the NLRA: As long as collective bargaining rights are limited to the
individual companies where workers have won a unionization election, executives
have an overwhelming incentive to fight like hell to stop that from happening, and
they have cause to fear they’ll be outcompeted by lower-cost rivals if they
don’t.
Labor
activists have notched the occasional impressive victory. “Comprehensive
campaigns”—intensive, often yearslong efforts where rather than relying on the
NLRB, unions hammer a company with a mix of workplace disruption; legal,
regulatory, and political assault; and reputational warfare—have proven potent enough
to secure deals that made unionization possible at firms such as Smithfield Foods Inc.
Pro-labor
state and local governments, though generally preempted from passing laws to
directly boost private-sector organizing, have been successfully squeezed by labor to
take those steps they can, such as easing the
unionization of government-funded home health care and airport service workers.
Public school teachers, by tying their
workplace struggles to the needs of their communities and striking in defiance
of lawmakers (and sometimes even their own union leaders), have forced
concessions from Democratic mayors and Republican governors alike.
None
of that has reversed labor’s overall decline. Each step forward depends on a
certain amount of luck and is vulnerable to being banned by hostile courts and
politicians. But the odds are also stacked against transformative legislation,
which has repeatedly eluded labor. Under President Jimmy Carter, amid one of
many doomed efforts to change U.S. labor laws, the AFL-CIO resorted to
purchasing a plaintive ad in the Wall Street Journal, posing to “American
Business” the question, “Do you want to destroy American trade unionism?” They
did, and to a large extent, they have. (Some union leaders’ passivity,
corruption, and bigotry played a part, too.)
And
so, strategy debates among union
activists often take the form of people who say it’s hopeless to expect the
legal regime to change without first having a resurgence of labor activism vs.
people who say it’s hopeless to expect a resurgence of organizing without first
overhauling the legal regime that crushes it. Each side has a pretty good
point.
That
Catch-22 helps explain why labor is desperate for an opening. The coronavirus,
which is remaking U.S. workplaces in real time, just might qualify. While
immiserating workers and devastating many of their employers, it’s also forged an upsurge in
workplace activism, as people who would otherwise be too afraid of retaliation
to take collective action decide they’re too afraid of employer-created
hazards not to.
Their
strikes and protests, which have spread through warehouses, meatpacking plants,
fast-food restaurants, and hospitals, are buoyed by the public recognition that
often-forgotten workers are actually essential. They’re also elevated by
partial or temporary pandemic-inspired precedents that raise some larger questions.
Why
should Congress guarantee Covid-specific paid days off for some months in 2020
at some medium-size companies and not for everyone else all the time? Why
should workers get protection against being purged for alerting the public
about safety issues in New York City and Philadelphia—as will happen if local
bills proposed there become
law—and not just shielded against capricious terminations across the board and
across the nation? If the pandemic spurs a wave of much more ambitious local
lawmaking and a mass refusal by more workers to remain on or return to the job,
all sorts of things could happen.
Possibly
even at corporate hyperpowers such as Amazon, where management seems to be
having a harder time than usual shoving its recent controversies out of the
spotlight. In April, white-collar Amazon tech workers held a daylong sickout
and virtual rally to protest the alleged retaliatory firings in its warehouses
and offices. A week later a senior engineer and vice president named Tim Bray
announced he was resigning in
dismay—likely forfeiting more than a million dollars in unvested stock and
other compensation—because of its dismissal of activists he described as
whistleblowers, including Emily Cunningham.
“I
think there are a lot more people like me waiting to be pushed,” Bray told a
group of union activists on a June Zoom call, saying he’s received ample
private encouragement from his peers. By then, state attorneys general were
calling Amazon’s sick leave inadequate, and U.S. senators were demanding
answers about retaliation.
Cunningham
says the backlash against terminating her and the others only deepened the
resolve of Amazon’s activists. Ultimately, she says, the retaliation will
backfire. “You cut off one head, and then five grow in its place.”
Editor: Jeff Muskus
With assistance from David Ingold,
Phil Kuntz and Alexander McIntyre
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