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Where
Will The Next Crisis Come From?
AUGUST 20, 2018
Key Points
· It’s
been 10 years since a U.S. financial shock turned into a crisis in the global
financial, market and economic system.
· A shock
turns into a crisis when the system is unprepared for it. The system is often
at its most vulnerable near the end of the global economic cycle when excesses
have built up and managing risks may have been neglected.
· The
global economic, financial and market system now seems better prepared to
manage the shocks of the past were they to repeat in the future. But there are
other increased vulnerabilities including: high debt levels, political
fragmentation, dependence on international sales, little fiscal or monetary
policy ammunition, and the rise of passive investments.
It’s been 10 years since a U.S. financial shock turned into a
crisis in the global financial, market and economic system. On September 15,
2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy as the shock waves from subprime
mortgages rocked the entire financial system, shattering confidence and leading
to an economic downfall.
Regularly paying attention to financial news reveals one thing
for certain: shocks to the global system happen all the time. Many of these
shocks are absorbed by the system without much disruption. Recent examples of
shocks might include last year’s escalating geopolitical tensions between the
U.S. and North Korea, the U.S. Fed beginning to reverse QE (quantitative
easing), or the rapid unwinding of the short-volatility trade that took place
earlier this year.
A shock turns into a crisis when the system is unprepared for
it. The system is often at its most vulnerable near the end of the global
economic cycle when excesses have built up and managing risks may have been
neglected. Since we have likely reached the later stages of the cycle, it is
now a good time to assess how well the system is prepared for the shocks that
lie ahead and where the biggest vulnerabilities may lie.
Hundreds of shocks turned into relatively few crises that hit
stocks
Better prepared for some
shocks
The global economic, financial and market system now seems
better prepared to manage the shocks of the past were they to repeat in the
future thanks to: stable energy supplies, low inflation, “circuit breakers”,
few fixed exchange rates, a lack of extreme valuations, lots of corporate cash,
and stronger banks.
1. Stable energy supplies – A frequent source of shocks that the system
has been vulnerable to in the past has been abrupt shifts in the supply of oil:
the Arab oil embargo in 1973, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the
U.S. shale oil boom in 2014-15. Each of these lead to very big moves in the
price of oil, up or down. Fortunately, today’s increased economic efficiency
with regard to oil, as you can see in the chart below, and the growth in non-OPEC
supply (notably from the U.S.) would likely have limited the vulnerability of
the system to the shocks in 1973 and 1990.
2. Low inflation –
Inflation remains low and well-contained on a global basis. Markets reflect a
high degree of confidence in central banks to stay ahead of the curve on
inflation based on inflation forecasts embedded in bond yields and economists’
forecasts. This marks a stark contrast to soaring inflation among many
countries in the 1970s as central banks got behind the curve on inflation. This
forced an abrupt shock on a vulnerable global system as the Federal Reserve
aggressively hiked rates into the double-digits in 1979-80 to end the cycle of
spiraling inflation at the cost of a global bear market and recession.
3. Circuit breakers – The so-called “circuit breakers” would have
made the stock market less vulnerable to the selling forces that drove the
October 19, 1987 stock market crash where the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped 508
points, or 22.6%, the biggest one-day decline in the history of the stock
market. A similar one-day drop in the Dow today would be almost 6,000 points.
Then, an options technique referred to as “portfolio insurance,”
which hedges a portfolio of stocks by short selling stock index futures,
depended on the ability to sell more as the market declined. This allowed the
drop to feed on itself and overwhelm the trading systems. To avoid such selling
pressure in the future, circuit breakers were implemented in 1989 across all
exchanges which halt trading for periods of time when the stock market hits
certain percentage declines. The periodic “flash crashes” we have seen since
then have been reserved to very short intra-day moves.
4. Few fixed exchange rates – The fixed exchange rate regimes that fed the
1998 Asian crisis have all but completely vanished. A major difference between
the Asian crisis of 1998 and today is that most emerging markets (EMs) have
floating rather than fixed exchange rates, limiting a vulnerability to shocks.
Floating exchange rates mean that shocks can be absorbed over time instead of
hitting suddenly when multiple currencies devalue by a large amount all at once
as we saw in Asia during the fall of 1998. Also, EM current accounts are now in
balance, on average, rather than in deficit as they were in 1997-98 when they
were dependent upon foreign lending to sustain their trade deficits, as you can
see in the chart below. Finally, EMs have much greater foreign currency
reserves that can be used to defend their currencies than they did 20 years
ago.
5. Valuations not at
extremes – There are many
measures of stock market valuations. On balance, those valuations are above
average, as is typical after an extended period of growth, but not at
extremes or as broadly above average as they were in 2000. Extreme valuations
make the market vulnerable to a shock in the form of missing lofty
expectations. Both the higher level of valuations and the number of industries
that had extreme valuations in 2000 compared to today can be seen in the chart
below. The economic vulnerability to the 2000 shock was increased by how much
investment had poured into intangible goodwill as opposed to productive assets
as the valuation bubble inflated.
6. Lots of corporate cash –
Companies have lots of cash relative to history according to data compiled by
Bloomberg. This lack of a vulnerability, in our view, that in the past has led
to the need for forced sales of assets to support companies’ core businesses
may help keep a shock from developing into a crisis. It also suggests the
potential for corporate share buybacks that might limit the vulnerability of
stock prices to investor selling pressure.
7. Stronger banks – In our opinion, banks are less vulnerable
today than they were ahead of the 2008-09 financial crisis and the 2012 European
debt crisis. Most importantly, there has been a reduction in risky activities,
including sub-prime mortgage lending. There have also been substantial
regulatory and institutional changes which aim to address some of the systemic
weaknesses that contributed to the global financial crisis, these include: the
establishment of new regulatory institutions, bank stress tests and increased
capital requirements, bank taxes and fees, “bail-in” provisions, increased
savings protection, and altered incentive structures. There is further progress
to be made, especially in Europe where the banking system is still not
integrated. But it’s clear that on measurable benchmarks banks are much better
prepared. For example, banks are much better capitalized than in 2008-09 and
2011-12 crises with Tier 1 capital ratios considerably higher than they were
going into past crises, as you can see in the chart below.
Increased vulnerability
to other shocks
The global economic, financial and market system now seems
better prepared to manage the shocks of the past were they to repeat in the
future. But there are other increased vulnerabilities that may make future
shocks turn into a crisis:
1. High
debt levels could magnify a shock from higher interest rates.
2. Political
fragmentation may impair an effective response to a shock.
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